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COMMITMENT AND DIFFUSION: HOW 






Drafters of new constitutions face a bewildering array of choices 
as they seek to design stable and workable political institutions for 
their societies.  One such set of choices concerns the status of interna-
tional law in the domestic legal order.  In a global era, with an ex-
panding array of customary and treaty norms purporting to regulate 
formerly domestic behavior, this question takes on political salience.  
This paper seeks to describe the phenomenon of constitutional incor-
poration of international law in greater detail and provide a prelimi-
nary empirical test of the competing explanations for it.  First, the dis-
cussion focuses on the concepts of monism and dualism, which have 
become conventional terms used by lawyers to describe the interac-
tion of domestic and international legal systems.  Second, a theory of 
commitments as well as the advantages and disadvantages of interna-
tional law are set forth.  Third, empirical implications are developed 
for the precommitment and diffusion theories, which are then tested.  
Findings show that adopting international law is a useful strategy for 
democracies to lock in particular policies, encourage trust in govern-
ments and state regimes, and bolster global reputations. 
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I. INTRODUCTION 
Drafters of new constitutions, from Iraq to Montenegro, face a be-
wildering array of choices as they seek to design stable and workable po-
litical institutions for their societies.  One such set of choices concerns the 
status of international law in the domestic legal order.  In a global era, 
with an expanding array of customary and treaty norms purporting to 
regulate formerly domestic behavior, this question takes on particular sa-
lience. 
The design choices are myriad.  Should customary international law 
be directly binding in the domestic legal order?  When will particular in-
ternational treaties be constitutionalized?  What status should be given 
to international treaties?  States differ significantly along these dimen-
sions, as Part II below demonstrates.  In this paper, we are concerned not 
with normative answers about what states should do, but rather the posi-
tive question about what conditions give rise to different configurations 
in national constitutions.  Why do states vary in their approach to inter-
national law? 
In a recent treatment, Tom Ginsburg approaches the problem from 
the perspective of positive constitutional theory, in particular treating 
constitutions as precommitment devices.1  Constitutions as precommit-
ment devices represent self-binding acts, whereby drafters restrict the ac-
tions available to future politicians.2  By constraining choices to be made 
at a later time, constitutions can help to resolve current political prob-
lems and thereby facilitate stable political order in the future.  Ginsburg’s 
theory focuses specifically on these precommitment functions of interna-
tional law provisions, noting that they are distinct from other forms of 
constitutional precommitment in that they offer a means of placing poli-
cies beyond the control of any domestic actor.  Such functions, he argues, 
will be particularly useful for certain kinds of states, namely those that 
are undergoing a transition to democracy.  Ginsburg presented prelimi-
nary evidence suggesting that such states are more likely to be open to 
customary international law, and to provide for treaty-making structures 
that build on the logic of precommitment.3  International law can lock in 
 
 1. Tom Ginsburg, Locking in Democracy: Constitutions, Commitment and International Law, 38 
N.Y.U. J. INT’L L. & POL. 707 (2006). 
 2. JON ELSTER, ULYSSES AND THE SIRENS: STUDIES IN RATIONALITY AND IRRATIONALITY 
36–111 (1979); STEPHEN HOLMES, PASSIONS AND CONSTRAINT: ON THE THEORY OF LIBERAL 
DEMOCRACY 134–77 (1995) [hereinafter HOLMES, PASSIONS AND CONSTRAINT]; Stephen Holmes, 
Precommitment and the Paradox of Democracy, in CONSTITUTIONALISM AND DEMOCRACY 195 (Jon 
Elster & Rune Slagstad eds., 1988) [hereinafter Holmes, Paradox of Democracy]. 
 3. For other theories of this phenomenon, see Tom Buergenthal, Modern Constitutions and 
Human Rights Treaties, in POLITICS, VALUES AND FUNCTIONS 197, 200 (Johnathan I. Charney et al. 
eds., 1997) (“Countries that had lived under non-democratic regimes in the past were especially eager 
to endow their courts with the legal power not to give effect to national laws or executive decisions in 
conflict with the states’ international human rights obligations.”); see also John H. Jackson, Status of 
Treaties in Domestic Legal Systems: A Policy Analysis, 86 AM. J. INT’L L. 310, 335 (1992). 
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these commitments, increasing the prospect of compliance past the life of 
the current government or regime, in environments of fragile democracy. 
There is an alternative hypothesis, however, that might explain the 
empirical patterns observed in Ginsburg’s paper.  It may be that new 
democracies are instead particularly prone to adopting “internationalist” 
constitutions as part of a trend among countries to do so during the late 
twentieth century wave of constitutional reforms.4  The incorporation of 
international law, in that view, is part of a more general process of diffu-
sion in which the constitutional choices of one country alter the choice 
set and the calculus of others.  Study after study confirms the explanatory 
power of this sort of conformity in policy choices across a range of sub-
stantive domains and settings.5  The constitutional drafting exercise—
which is often set in situations of national crisis and institutional uncer-
tainty6—is particularly amenable to these sorts of influences.  Under such 
circumstances, leaders are arguably more sensitive to reputational con-
cerns.  At the same time, limitations on time and information lead them 
toward considering legal models that are readily available elsewhere.  
Both of these sets of conditions—a highly symbolic decision process and 
cognitive constraints—favor the complementary diffusion processes of 
adaptation and learning that we describe more fully below.  The resulting 
legal structure may suggest a hybrid form characteristic of constitutional 
“bricolage,” but one that nevertheless exhibits particular patterns over 
time and across space.7 
This paper seeks to describe the phenomenon of constitutional in-
corporation of international law in greater detail and to provide a pre-
liminary empirical test of these competing explanations.  Part II intro-
duces the topic by describing the concepts of monism and dualism, which 
have become conventional ways for international lawyers and scholars to 
speak about the interaction of the domestic and international legal sys-
tems.  Part III sets out the theory of commitments and explains the rela-
tive advantages (and disadvantages) of international law, both customary 
and those embodied in international agreements.  Part IV develops em-
pirical implications, which are then tested in Part V.  Part VI concludes. 
 
 4. For a conceptual review of the diffusion of policy ideas and institutions, see Zachary Elkins 
& Beth Simmons, On Waves, Clusters and Diffusion: A Conceptual Framework,  598 ANNALS AM. 
ACAD. OF POL. & SOC. SCI. 33, 39–40 (2005). 
 5. Jon Elster, Forces and Mechanisms in the Constitution-Making Process, 45 DUKE L.J. 364, 
369–70 (1995). 
 6. Id. at 366–67. 
 7. Mark Tushnet, The Possibilities of Comparative Constitutional Law, 108 YALE L.J. 1225, 
1285–1301 (1999) (discussing the concept of bricolage). 
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II. THE INTERACTION OF DOMESTIC AND INTERNATIONAL LEGAL 
ORDERS 
National constitutional provisions vary widely in terms of their rela-
tionship with international law.  International lawyers and scholars have 
traditionally used the concept of monism and dualism to describe the re-
lationship between international legal order and the domestic legal or-
der.8  Monism sees international law and the domestic legal system as 
part of the same legal order.9  International law has a primary place in 
this unitary legal system, such that domestic legal systems must always 
conform to the requirements of international law or find themselves in 
violation.10  This would be true whether or not domestic legal actors had 
taken any formal steps to introduce international legal norms into the 
domestic legal order in accordance with domestic constitutional rules. 
In contrast, dualism views the international legal order as distinct, 
only penetrating the domestic legal order by explicit consent of the state 
involved.  When the two systems conflict, national courts would apply 
their own national law.  From a dualist perspective, the international le-
gal order could purport to bind actors within states, but consent is re-
quired to do so as a matter of domestic law.11  International legal obliga-
tions would require transposition into the domestic order to take effect.  
Absent such transposition, there is the distinct possibility of an action be-
ing legal in national law but illegal in international law; in which case, a 
dualist would presume that courts should apply the rules of national 
law.12 
A further complexity is that monism and dualism can vary with the 
type of obligation, so that some states are monist with regard to treaty 
law but dualist with regard to customary international law.  For example, 
the Netherlands Constitution of 1983 places international treaties above 
the Constitution, and explicitly states that statutes that conflict with in-
ternational law are void.13  But the Dutch Constitution does not give the 
 
 8. IAN BROWNLIE, PRINCIPLES OF PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL LAW 31–33 (5th ed. 1998); 
ANTONIO CASSESE, INTERNATIONAL LAW 213–17 (2d ed. 2005); Jackson, supra note 3, at 313–15; see 
also Richard Frimpong Oppong, Re-Imagining International Law: An Examination of Recent Trends in 
the Reception of International Law into National Legal Systems in Africa, 30 FORDHAM INT’L L.J. 296, 
297–98 (2007). 
 9. LOUIS HENKIN, INTERNATIONAL LAW: POLITICS AND VALUES 64 (1995). 
 10. But see CASSESE, supra note 8, at 213–14 (noting another early view of monism that put do-
mestic law as primary). 
 11. Id. at 214. 
 12. BROWNLIE, supra note 8, at 32.  The high point of monist thinking is found in the Permanent 
Court of International Justice opinion in Exchange of Greek and Turkish Populations (Greece v. 
Turk), Advisory Opinion, 1925 P.C.I.J. (ser. B) No. 10, at 20 (Feb. 21) at 20 (states which have entered 
into international obligations have a duty to modify national law so as to satisfy the obligations prom-
ised). 
 13. GRONDWET [GW.] [Constitution] art. 91(3) (Neth.) (providing for approval of treaties that 
conflict with the constitution by two-thirds vote); id. at art. 94 (statutes in conflict with treaties are in-
applicable).  For an explanation, see CASSESE, supra note 8, at 229 n.30 (discussing several countries’ 
methods of determining treaties’ precedence); see also Jackson, supra note 3, at 332–34. 
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same status to customary international law.14  In Germany, Italy and 
Austria, by contrast, customary international law is superior to domestic 
statutes, but treaties are equal to domestic statues, with the last-in-time 
rule determining which is valid.15  This is the opposite configuration of 
the Dutch Constitution.  To take another example, the Constitution of 
Russia states that the “[u]niversally recognized principles and norms of 
international law as well as international agreements of the Russian Fed-
eration should be an integral part of its legal system.  If an international 
agreement of the Russian Federation establishes rules, which differ from 
those stipulated by law, then the rules of international agreement shall be 
applied.”16  France has yet another configuration, in which treaties have 
higher status than subsequent legislation, but the French constitution is 
silent on customary international law.17  In Switzerland, preemptory 
norms of jus cogens, but not other rules of customary international law, 
are superior to the Constitution.18  Finally, constitutions can require that 
courts interpret the document in conformity with international human 
rights law.19 
The United Kingdom, with its long tradition of parliamentary su-
premacy, would seem to be dualist.20  Parliamentary sovereignty was fa-
mously defined by Albert Dicey as “the right to make or unmake any law 
whatever; and further, that no person or body is recognized by the law of 
England as having a right to override or set aside the legislation of Par-
liament.”21  This means that parliament is unconstrained by national 
courts and also by international bodies; parliament is also free to pass 
statutes that conflict with prior treaties.  This stance came under some 
pressure from the European Union and the European Court of Human 
Rights, because the British treaty commitments accept European law to 
 
 14. The Constitution does not mention customary international law per se. 
 15. CASSESE, supra note 8, at 225, 229–30. 
 16. Konstitutsiia Rossiiskoi Federatsii [Konst. RF] art. 15(4).  An interesting variant is found in 
Article 11 of the 1992 Slovak Constitution, stating that “International instruments on human rights 
and freedoms ratified by the Slovak Republic and promulgated under statutory requirements shall 
take precedence over national laws provided that the international treaties and agreements guarantee 
greater constitutional rights and freedoms.”  ÚSTAVA SLOVENSKEJ REPUBLIKY [Constitution] art. 11 
(Slovk.).  For a discussion, see Vladlen S. Vereshchetin, New Constitutions and the Old Problem of the 
Relationship between International Law and National Law, 7 EUR. J. INT’L L. 29 (1996). 
 17. CASSESE, supra note 8, at 228; HENKIN, supra note 9, at 73; Dominique Remy-Granger, The 
Ambiguities of the State Based on the Rule of Law: A Unitary System à la Française, in AMBIGUITY IN 
THE RULE OF LAW: THE INTERFACE BETWEEN NATIONAL AND INTERNATIONAL LEGAL SYSTEMS 53, 
53–54 (Thomas A.J.A. Vandamme & Jan-Herman Reestman eds., 2001). 
 18. Constitution fédérale de la Confédération Suisse [Cst] April 18, 1999, art. 194, ¶ 2 (Switz.). 
 19. E.g., CONST. OF THE PORTUGUESE REPUBLIC art. 16 § 2; C.E. [Constitution] pt. I, § 10, cl.2 
(Swed.); CONST. OF ROMANIA art. 20, § 1; S. AFR. CONST. 1996, § 233. 
 20. Jackson, supra note 3, at 319.  But see Melissa A. Waters, Creeping Monism: The Judicial 
Trend Toward Interpretive Incorporation of Human Rights Treaties, 107 COLUM. L. REV. 628, 635–36 
(2007) (arguing that courts are engaged in creeping monism in the UK and other common law jurisdic-
tions). 
 21. ALBERT V. DICEY, THE LAW OF THE CONSTITUTION 3–4 (8th ed. 1915). 
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be superior.22  Nevertheless, the doctrine of parliamentary sovereignty 
survives. 
At the same time, customary international law (CIL) was tradition-
ally viewed as part of the common law, and directly applicable so long as 
it was not overruled by subsequent statute or judicial decision.23  This is 
called the doctrine of incorporation, whereby changes in CIL are auto-
matically “incorporated” into the common law.24  For many decades, 
scholars have asserted that the UK has followed the competing doctrine 
of transformation, so that courts require some evidence of governmental 
intent to incorporate the international rule into domestic law before it 
will be applied; but the conventional view is that the doctrine of incorpo-
ration remains intact.25 
The United States Constitution establishes a scheme somewhat 
similar to that of the UK.26  Customary international law, or the “law of 
nations,” was traditionally viewed as part of federal common law.27  Arti-
cle I Section 8 of the Constitution also gives Congress the power to “de-
fine . . . offences against the law of nations.”28  This provision would seem 
to give the legislative branch primary control over the treatment of cus-
tom, but legislation is seldom based on this provision.29  Treaties are the 
“Supreme Law of the Land” according to the supremacy clause, although 
later-in-time statutes can supersede them.30  Thus Congress and the 
President can together supersede a treaty adopted by the President and 
Senate alone.31 
 
 22. Case C-213/89, The Queen v. Sec’y of State for Transp. Exparte Factortame Ltd., 1990 E.C.R. 
1-2433. 
 23. BROWNLIE, supra note 8, at 42–43; see also INTERNATIONAL LAW DECISIONS IN NATIONAL 
COURTS 3 (Thomas D. Franck & Gregory H. Fox eds., 1996). 
 24. Trendtex Trading Corp. v. Cent. Bank of Nig., (1977) Q.B. 529, 553–54. 
 25. See Trendtex Trading Corp., (1977) Q.B. at 553–54; BROWNLIE, supra note 8, at 43–46 (dis-
cussing case law); see also discussion in Waters, supra note 20. 
 26. Curtis A. Bradley, Breard, Our Dualist Constitution, and the Internationalist Conception, 51 
STAN. L. REV. 529, 530–31 (1999). 
 27. See Curtis A. Bradley & Jack L. Goldsmith, Customary International Law as Federal Com-
mon Law: A Critique of the Modern Position, 110 HARV. L. REV. 815, 822 (1997); Harold Hongju Koh, 
Commentary, Is International Law Really State Law?, 111 HARV. L. REV. 1824, 1825–26 (1998); Ge-
rald L. Neuman, Sense and Nonsense About Customary International Law: A Response to Professors 
Bradley and Goldsmith, 66 FORDHAM L. REV. 371, 371–72 (1997); Jordan J. Paust, Customary Interna-
tional Law and Human Rights Treaties are Law of the United States, 20 MICH. J. INT’L L. 301, 301 
(1999). 
 28. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 10. 
 29. The sole exception may be the Alien Tort Claims Act, 28 U.S.C. § 1350 (2000).  For a recent 
discussion, see William S. Dodge, After Sosa: The Future of Customary International Law in the United 
States (Nov. 11, 2006) (unpublished working paper), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=944245.  See 
also LOUIS HENKIN, FOREIGN AFFAIRS AND THE UNITED STATES CONSTITUTION 68 (2d ed. 1996) 
(noting the power “has been little used, and its purport has not been wholly clear”); Beth Stephens, 
Federalism and Foreign Affairs: Congress’s Power To “Define And Punish . . . Offenses Against the 
Law of Nations,” 42 WM. & MARY L. REV. 447, 523 (2000). 
 30. HENKIN, supra note 29, at 211–12; Julian G. Ku, Treaties as Laws: A Defense of the Last-in-
Time Rule in Treaties and Federal Statutes, 80 IND. L.J. 319, 333–35 (2005). 
 31. Arguably, treaties have slightly higher status in that the Charming Betsy interpretive canon 
places the burden on Congress to be explicit when overriding treaties.  Murray v. Schooner Charming 
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These examples illustrate the great variety of ways in which states 
treat international law vis-à-vis domestic obligations.  There is no neces-
sary relationship between the treatment of customary international law 
and treaty law, nor any general convergence among states in terms of the 
manner in which they treat international obligations. 
Another dimension of interest is that some countries directly incor-
porate particular international treaties into their constitutions.  This con-
stitutionalization of particular treaty regimes most often involves human 
rights treaties.  In this article, we analyze a dataset of 363 constitutions 
coded as part of the Comparative Constitutions Project at the University 
of Illinois.32  In the current dataset, twenty-eight percent of constitutions 
written after 1945 (n=283) reference at least one international treaty, but 
only ten percent of these constitutions explicitly incorporate the provi-
sions of the treaties.  Figure 1 shows the frequency of the mention and 
incorporation of particular treaties.  The Universal Declaration of Hu-
man Rights is the most frequently referenced and incorporated docu-
ment, followed by the United Nations Charter and the African Charter 
of Human People’s Rights.33  For example, Nicaragua’s constitution de-
clares “full applicability of the rights set forth in the Universal Declara-
tion of Human Rights, the American Declaration of the Rights and Du-
ties of Man, the International Covenant of Economic, Social and 
Cultural Rights, the International Covenant of Civil and Political Rights, 
and the American Convention of Human Rights of the Organization of 
American States.”34  The Constitution of the Republic of Congo (Braz-
zaville) “declare[s] as an integral part of the . . . Constitution” the Char-
ter of the United Nations, the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, 
and the African Charter of the Rights of Man and Peoples.35  On custom-
ary international law, however, both of these constitutions are silent. 
 
Betsy, 6 U.S. (2 Cranch) 64, 118 (1804); Yuval Shany, How Supreme is the Supreme Law of the Land? 
Comparative Analysis of the Influence of International Human Rights Treaties Upon the Interpretation 
of Constitutional Texts by Domestic Courts, 31 BROOK. J. INT’L L. 341, 364 (2006). 
 32. See Comparative Constitutions Project, http://netfiles.uiuc.edu/zelkins/constitutions/index. 
htm (last visited Oct. 23, 2007). 
 33. Our threshold for what constitutes incorporation, as opposed to a mere reference to a treaty, 
is relatively high.  We focus on explicit language that makes the treaty clearly enforceable or an inte-
gral part of a constitution.  We did not consider general statements about the respect for and observa-
tion of “principles” of particular treaties to be full incorporation. 
 34. Constitución Política de la República de Nicaragua [Cn.] [Constitution] art. 46, La Gaceta 
[L.G.] 9 January 1987; see also, CONST. ARG., ch. IV, § 75.22 (referencing American Declaration of the 
Rights and Duties of Man; Universal Declaration of Human Rights; American Convention of Human 
Rights; International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights; International Covenant on 
Civil and Political Rights). 
 35. See CONSTITUTION OF THE REPUBLIC OF CONGO (BRAZZAVILLE) pmbl.; see also 
CONSTITUTION OF THE REPUBLIC OF BENIN, pmbl. (referencing Charter of the United Nations of 
1945, Universal Declaration of Human Rights of 1948, African Charter on Human and People’s Rights 
of 1981). 
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FIGURE 1 
NUMBER OF CONSTITUTIONS THAT MENTION OR INCORPORATE 
SELECTED INTERNATIONAL TREATIES 
Universe: Constitutions adopted in or after 1945 (n = 283) 
Treaty Mentioned Incorporated 
UN Universal Declaration of Human 
Rights (1948) 69 24 
French Declaration of the Rights of 
Man (1789) 10 0 
UN Charter (1945) 27 6 
European Convention for Protection 
of Human Rights and Funda-
mental Freedoms (1950) 
2 2 
International Covenant of Civil and 
Political  Rights (1966) 7 1 
International Covenant of Economic 
and Social Rights (1966) 4 1 
American Convention on Human 
Rights (1969) 2 1 
Helsinki Accords (1966) 1 1 
African Charter of Human People’s 
Rights (1981) 23 4 
Number of constitutions with at least 
one of the above 80 28 
Source: Comparative Constitutions Project 
One can think of these various dimensions of choice as reflecting a 
single underlying concept of internationalization.  More internationalist 
constitutions make customary international law directly binding; give 
both treaties and customary international law superior authority to local 
legislation, even if adopted later; and specifically incorporate particular 
human rights treaties.  Less internationalist constitutions require cus-
tomary international law and treaties to be specifically incorporated by 
national legislation into the local legal order, or give them an inferior po-
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sition vis-à-vis legislation and do not incorporate specific treaties.  No 
doubt there are tradeoffs among these various dimensions of interna-
tionalization, some of which we discuss below. 
Clearly there are trends in national constitutions over time.  For 
theoretical reasons we divide the analysis into three periods: the pre-1914 
years, the interwar period, and the post-1944 years.  Preliminary analysis 
of constitutional drafting over time reveals a number of interesting 
trends.36  The incorporation of customary international law predates 
World War I.  References to customary international law were more 
prevalent in national constitutions written before 1914 than in those 
drafted in or after 1945, and least prevalent in the interwar years.  By 
contrast, decisions to make customary international law directly applica-
ble increased over time.  In fact, the proportion of constitutions incorpo-
rating customary international law in the domestic legal order doubled 
from the pre-1914 to the post-1944 periods.  Finally, the notion of making 
international treaties superior to domestic legislation is a phenomenon of 
the post-1944 period.  None of the constitutions written before 1945 in-
cluded in the current sample granted superior status to international 
treaties.37 
FIGURE 2 
CONSTITUTIONAL STATUS OF CUSTOMARY INTERNATIONAL LAW (CIL) 
AND TREATIES OVER TIME 
Universe: Constitutions of independent states since 1789 















28% (10) 18% (6) 23% (67) 23% (83) 
CIL Directly  




0% (0) 0% (0) 23% (67) 18% (67) 
Source: Comparative Constitutions Project 
 
 36. Unfortunately, our current sample does not allow us to draw definitive conclusions about 
these trends, since we do not yet have a complete sample of coded constitutions from before 1944.  
However, our current sample is, for present purposes, randomly selected, and we believe our results 
are strongly suggestive. 
 37. All the human rights treaties coded in our data were written after 1945, which makes it im-
possible to assess the trends over time for the periods of analysis. 
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No doubt many of these trends reflect the changing content and 
scope of international law.  Whereas customary international law before 
World War I chiefly governed classic interstate issues such as diplomatic 
relations, thereafter the content of customary international law changed 
to gradually include more direct regulation of human rights issues.38  
Making customary international law directly applicable in national courts 
made little sense until the content of that law applied to individuals.  Fur-
thermore, the number and scope of international agreements also ex-
panded, and international treaties increasingly covered human rights is-
sues.39 
III. HOW INTERNATIONAL LAW CAN AFFECT THE DOMESTIC LEGAL 
ORDER 
A. Precommitment Theory 
We now see that every constitutional system has a particular con-
figuration in terms of how it treats international obligations, and that pat-
terns across countries have changed over time.  Internationalization, 
broadly speaking, has increased over time, with more constitutions in-
corporating specific treaties, providing for treaty superiority over domes-
tic legislation, and making customary international law directly applica-
ble, even as the scope of customary law has expanded dramatically. 
Why might these issues of constitutional design vary across coun-
tries and time?  We follow Ginsburg in drawing on literature that treats 
constitutions as mechanisms for making political precommitments.40  A 
precommitment means “becoming committed, bound or obligated to 
some course of action or inaction or to some constraint on future ac-
tion . . . . to influence someone else’s choices.”41  Consider for example a 
politician seeking to establish legitimate authority over a citizenry.  The 
politician can promise to behave with moderation, protecting the rights 
of citizens and pursuing liberal policies.  The citizenry may believe the 
politician is sincere, but they may still be reluctant to trust the promise of 
the politician because they know his or her circumstance may change.  
The promise only has value if the citizenry believes that the sincere poli-
tician will not change his mind should he face different circumstances 
down the road.  The politician must therefore make the promise credi-
ble.42  This problem is particularly acute when the politician cannot pre-
 
 38. HENKIN, supra note 9, at 169, 173 (1995). 
 39. See id. 
 40. ELSTER, supra note 2, at 36–111; JON ELSTER, ULYSSES UNBOUND: STUDIES IN 
RATIONALITY, PRECOMMITMENT, AND CONSTRAINTS 129–41, 157–62 (2000); HOLMES, PASSIONS AND 
CONSTRAINT, supra note 2, at 134–77; JED RUBENFELD, FREEDOM AND TIME: A THEORY OF 
CONSTITUTIONAL SELF-GOVERNMENT 129–30 (2001); Holmes, Paradox of Democracy, supra note 2. 
 41. THOMAS C. SCHELLING, STRATEGIES OF COMMITMENT AND OTHER ESSAYS 1 (2006). 
 42. See Barry R. Weingast, Constitutions as Governance Structures: The Political Foundations of 
Secure Markets, 149  J. INSTITUTIONAL & THEORETICAL ECON. 286, 288 (1993); Barry R. Weingast, 
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dict the incentives he or she will face in the future.43  If costs and benefits 
vary in unpredictable ways, the politician’s promise to behave in the 
specified way may be less believable. 
Constitutions can help solve this problem.  A rational constitutional 
designer might realize that it makes sense to limit her own power, in or-
der to make her promises credible and thereby obtain the consent of the 
governed.  Democratic constitutions can help facilitate this role, serving 
as “‘precommitment strategies’ in which nations, aware of problems that 
are likely to arise, take steps to ensure that those problems will not arise 
or that they will produce minimal damage if they do.”44  Constitutions 
help make the promises credible by imposing costs on those who violate 
promises.  By tying their own hands, politicians actually can enhance 
their own authority. 
There are a myriad of ways that constitutions can play this role.  Jon 
Elster elaborates how constitutional provisions function not only to con-
strain politicians, but also to restrain the power of the people.45  For ex-
ample, in the American context, the existence of a bicameral legislature 
and an executive veto makes legislation more difficult.  This can be seen 
as a device to restrain the “passions” of the people, who might otherwise 
act through legislative majorities in unwise ways.46  Other features of 
constitutions that enhance precommitment include high amendment 
thresholds and an independent judiciary.47 
B. International Law as Precommitment 
To the extent that international law binds states and limits the op-
tions of policymakers, it can serve as a precommitment device.  One way 
to do this is for constitutional designers to incorporate specific policies 
and international instruments into the constitutional text.48  The earlier 
 
The Political Foundations of Democracy and the Rule of Law, 91 AM. POL. SCI. REV. 245, 259 (1997); 
Oliver E. Williamson, Credible Commitments—Using Hostages to Support Exchange, 73 AM. ECON. 
REV. 519, 519 (1983). 
 43. See generally GEORGE W. DOWNS & DAVID M. ROCKE, OPTIMAL IMPERFECTION? 
DOMESTIC UNCERTAINTY AND INSTITUTIONS IN INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS (1997). 
 44. CASS SUNSTEIN, DESIGNING DEMOCRACY: WHAT CONSTITUTIONS DO 241 (2001); see also 
F.A. HAYEK, THE CONSTITUTION OF LIBERTY 179 (1960) (“[The reason for constitutions] is that all 
men in the pursuit of immediate aims are apt—or, because of the limitation of their intellect, in fact 
bound—to violate rules of conduct which they would nevertheless wish to see generally observed.  
Because of the restricted capacity of our minds, our immediate purposes will always loom large, and 
we will tend to sacrifice long-term advantages to them.”); HOLMES, supra note 2, at 153; A.C. Pritchard 
& Todd J. Zywicki, Finding the Constitution: An Economic Analysis of Tradition’s Role in Constitu-
tional Interpretation, 77 N.C. L. REV. 409, 447–49 (1999). 
 45. Jon Elster, Intertemporal Choice and Political Thought, in CHOICE OVER TIME 35 (George 
Loewenstein & Jon Elster eds., 1992). 
 46. See THE FEDERALIST Nos. 48, 49 (James Madison). 
 47. Donald J. Boudreaux & A.C. Pritchard, Rewriting the Constitution: An Economic Analysis of 
the Constitutional Amendment Process, 62 FORDHAM L. REV. 111, 123–26 (1993) (amendment proc-
esses); William M. Landes & Richard A. Posner, The Independent Judiciary in an Interest-Group Per-
spective, 18 J.L. & ECON. 875, 892 (1975). 
 48. See supra text accompanying notes 34–35. 
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discussion presenting evidence that constitution drafters incorporate 
human rights treaties into the domestic constitutional order is consistent 
with this idea.  By saying, for example, that the International Covenant 
of Civil and Political Rights is directly applicable, the constitution draft-
ers accept an international definition of international human rights, 
somewhat limiting their freedom of action and committing themselves to 
suffer costs if the rights are violated.49 
Explicit characterization of international law as a precommitment 
device is growing within the interdisciplinary scholarship linking interna-
tional law and international relations.50  Most literature to date focuses 
on how precommitment works among states that interact to advance 
their national interest, which is conceived as unitary.  Precommitment al-
lows states to communicate to other states that they are serious about 
their promises.  Certainly not all international agreements among states 
are precommitments, in the sense of giving up future choices to guard 
against preference shifts.51  States have many other reasons for entering 
into agreements.  But some kinds of agreements certainly act as pre-
commitments. 
Imagine, for example, a foreign investor interested in investing capi-
tal in a developing country.  The government may promise not to expro-
priate the capital, but even if the investor believes the sincerity of the 
promise, the time delay between the promise and the performance cre-
ates an enforcement problem.52  The current government may not last as 
long as the period needed to recoup the investment and sunk costs leave 
the investor vulnerable to Vernon’s “obsolescing bargaining” problem, in 
which the power of the host state increases over time.53  Bilateral invest-
ment treaties resolve this problem by making the government promise 
enforceable through international arbitration.  The treaty regime makes 
the government’s commitments more credible because it removes the ad-
judication of disputes from the government’s hands and raises the possi-
bility of externally imposed sanctions down the road.54  This in turn 
makes performance more likely. 
In the example above, and in most work to date, the promise by the 
government has an exclusively international audience—in this case the 
 
 49. We do not assert that the potential cost suffered is necessarily high. 
 50. See generally Kenneth W. Abbott & Duncan Snidal, Hard and Soft Law in International 
Governance, 54 INT’L ORG. 421 (2000); Steven R. Ratner, Precommitment Theory and International 
Law: Starting a Conversation, 81 TEX. L. REV. 2055 (2003). 
 51. Ratner, supra note 50, at 2070–72. 
 52. Technically, a dynamic inconsistency problem. 
 53. RAYMOND VERNON, SOVEREIGNTY AT BAY: THE MULTINATIONAL SPREAD OF U.S. 
ENTERPRISES 46–53 (1971). 
 54. Tom Ginsburg, International Substitutes for Domestic Institutions: Bilateral Investment Trea-
ties and Governance, 25 INT’L REV. L. & ECON. 107, 113 (2005); Andrew Guzman, Why LDCs Sign 
Treaties that Hurt Them: Explaining the Popularity of Bilateral Investment Treaties, 38 VA. J. INT’L L. 
639, 651–58 (1998); Zachary Elkins, Andrew Guzman & Beth Simmons, Competing for Capital: The 
Diffusion of Bilateral Investment Treaties, 1960–2000, 2008 U. ILL. L. REV. 265, 277–79. 
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investor—and costs that will be incurred internationally.  Sometimes, 
however, international commitment can also work to resolve problems 
for domestic governance.  If we relax the conventional modeling assump-
tion of a monadic state, we can see how international agreements can re-
solve domestic commitment problems. 
Domestic commitment differs from the conventional international 
story in that it does not necessarily involve a signal of private information 
by the politician.  When a politician makes an international promise to 
other states, he or she may try to communicate a serious intent to abide 
by the promise.  The seriousness of the politician is something other 
states usually cannot observe directly, so undertaking politically costly 
behavior such as asking parliament to ratify the agreement can commu-
nicate information to other states about the probability of compliance.  
By expending scarce political capital, the politician may raise the cost of 
defection and convince other states that she is serious about fulfilling the 
promise. 
The domestic political function of international promises does not 
necessarily require communication of information, but can rely simply on 
the increased costs associated with violations of international promises.  
The next section discusses the ways in which international promises af-
fect the domestic environment. 
C. How International Law Resolves Domestic Commitment Problems 
All politicians face problems committing to their promises.  In de-
mocracies, electoral institutions ensure that the politician will eventually 
be out of power.  Even in an autocracy, however, the risk of coup, revo-
lution, or democratization is always present, and supporters of any dicta-
tor will discount her promises by the probability of her losing power, 
however remote that probability may be.  We should thus see some de-
mand for devices to ensure that promises will be kept in both democra-
cies and autocracies.55 
Domestic legislation is one means of entrenching policies beyond 
the life (or the whim) of current political leaders.  A difficult legislative 
process means that the legislation will be relatively difficult to overturn 
in future periods.  A relatively easy process, by contrast, will mean that 
legislation is of less value in situations of electoral uncertainty, because a 
future politician can easily undo today’s policies. 
One can think of international law as helping to solve domestic 
commitment problems.56  A party that is unsure that it will remain in 
 
 55. Cf. DOWNS & ROCKE, supra note 43, at 56–75; Rachel Brewster, The Domestic Origins of 
International Agreements, 44 VA. J. INT’L. L. 501, 511–13 (2004) (both focusing on elections as the pri-
mary source of uncertainty). 
 56. Voigt and Salzberger provide one of the few attempts to think through tradeoffs in delega-
tion to international and domestic institutions.  Stefan Voigt & Eli M. Salzberger, Choosing Not to 
Choose: When Politicians Choose to Delegate Powers, 55 KYKLOS 289, 289–310 (2002).  In later work, 
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power in the future may wish to entrench its policies in the form of trea-
ties.  Because undoing international agreements is typically costly, a pol-
icy that is entrenched internationally may survive the demise of the cur-
rent political coalition or even regime.57  This increases the value of the 
commitment made to one’s supporters at the time of the promise. 
International commitment devices work in three different ways.58  
First, international obligations can generate information on the behavior 
of politicians in future periods.  This is relevant when the behavior in 
question is difficult for the domestic constituents to observe.  A politician 
that promises to undertake a particular course of action can enhance the 
value of his promise by utilizing international monitors, beyond the reach 
of any domestic politician, to generate neutral and valuable information 
on performance. 
Second, politicians can, in effect, bond their behavior by making 
sure that any future violation of the promise will generate costs imposed 
by international actors.  A government promise to submit to interna-
tional arbitration for investment disputes means that the government 
may have to pay compensation if it violates its promises.  It is the simple 
cost associated with violation, rather than information generated from 
abroad, that renders the mechanism useful for enhancing the commit-
ment. 
Third, politicians can make a credible commitment by delegating 
the decision-making authority to an independent international actor.  In 
this mode, the politician guards against her future preference shifts by 
completely ceding decision-making authority.  Let us consider each of 
these mechanisms in turn. 
1. Generating Information for Domestic Groups 
The first modality of international commitment is information gen-
eration.  Making an international commitment can generate information 
for domestic actors that might otherwise be unavailable to them.  Inter-
national organizations, foreign states, and nongovernmental organiza-
 
Voigt and coauthors find support for some of these hypotheses.  See, e.g., Stefan Voigt, Membership 
has its Privileges—On the Effects of Delegating Powers Internationally (Univ. of Kassel, Inst. of Econ., 
Discussion Papers in Economics No. 73/05, 2005), available at http://ideas.repec.org/p/kas/wpaper/ 
2005-73.html; Stefan Voigt, Michael Ebeling & Lorenz Blume, Improving Credibility by Delegating 
Judicial Competence—the Case of the Judicial Committee of the Privy Council (Univ. of Kassel, Inst. of 
Econ., Discussion Papers in Economics No. 07/04, 2004), available at http://ideas.repec.org/p/kas/ 
wpaper/2004-67.html. 
 57. For a similar observation focused on the tensions with democratic theory, see Terence Dain-
tith, Is International Law the Enemy of National Democracy?, in AMBIGUITY IN THE RULE OF LAW: 
THE INTERFACE BETWEEN NATIONAL AND INTERNATIONAL LEGAL SYSTEMS 115, 119 (Thomas 
A.J.A. Vandamme & Jan-Herman Reestman eds., 2001); see also Stefan Voigt, The Interplay between 
National and International Law—Its Economic Effects Drawing on Four New Indicators 12–18 (Au-
gust 2006), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=925796. 
 58. Cf. Pritchard & Zywicki, supra note 44, at 446–51 (discussing the precommitment and agency 
roles of constitutions). 
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tions have, under certain circumstances, an incentive to monitor the per-
formance of the state.59  It is well understood that information produced 
by international organizations and other states can help third-party states 
decide how to treat the state in question.60  But the information can also 
be useful for domestic constituencies.  Voters can learn about the non-
performance of their leaders.61  Domestic interest groups can determine 
whether politicians are delivering on promises to act on the international 
plane.  This information can reduce or eliminate the agency problem for 
voters and interest groups, and thus be advantageous to political leaders 
seeking their support ex ante. 
This may explain the pattern of successful complaints before the 
United Nations Human Rights Committee, established under the Inter-
national Covenant on Civil and Political Rights.62  Although many na-
tions have signed the International Covenant, not all have signed the first 
Optional Protocol which provides for an individual right of complaint.63  
Signing this document can be seen as a form of precommitment to pro-
tect human rights at home.  In practice, the most notable cases that have 
led to changes in state behavior have come against some of the states that 
best protect human rights.  For example, Canada was found to have vio-
lated the rights of aboriginal persons, and Australia the rights of homo-
sexuals.64  One might think about the international mechanism as serving 
an information-generating function, allowing local actors to put pressure 
on their governments by informing the public about violations of core 
rights.  This information then becomes important to organize efforts to 
change the behavior in question. 
This information modality works through enhancing the possibility 
of domestic punishment of a politician who violates his or her promise.  
The actual cost is incurred domestically, but the international obligation 
makes that cost more likely by providing legitimate third-party account-
 
 59. On NGOs, see Eugene Kontorovich, Inefficient Customs in International Law, 48 WM. & 
MARY L. REV. 859, 914–15 (2006); see also MARGARET KECK & KATHRYN SIKKINK, ACTIVISTS 
BEYOND BORDERS 89–120 (1998). 
 60. ROBERT O. KEOHANE, AFTER HEGEMONY: COOPERATION AND DISCORD IN THE WORLD 
POLITICAL ECONOMY 93–94 (1984). 
 61. See Brewster, supra note 55, at 535–37; Helen V. Milner, Why Democracies Cooperate More: 
Electoral Control and International Trade Agreements, 56 INT’L ORG. 477 (2002). 
 62. International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, G.A. Res. 2200A (XXI), U.N. Doc 
A/6316 (Dec. 16, 1966). 
 63. Optional Protocol to the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, G.A. Res. 
2200A (XXI), U.N. Doc. A/6136 (Dec. 16, 1966). 
 64. Lovelace v. Canada, Communication No. R 6/24, U.N. Doc. Supp. No. 40 (A/36/40) at 166 
(July 30, 1981) (declaring Canada responsible for continuing violation of individual rights of aboriginal 
women and their children); Nicholas Toonen v. Australia, Communication No. 488/1992, U.N. Doc. 
CCPR/C/50/D/488/1992 (1994); see also HENRY J. STEINER & PHILIP ALSTON, INTERNATIONAL 
HUMAN RIGHTS IN CONTEXT 745 (2d ed. 2000).  In the case of Australia, the Australian national gov-
ernment welcomed the decision as providing leverage against a recalcitrant provincial government that 
had continued to criminalize homosexual sovereignty.  Id. at 748. 
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ing of domestic behavior.65  The key factor is the interaction of the do-
mestic and international levels of governance, which generates different 
modalities of enforcement than would be possible at either level on its 
own. 
2. International Enforcement 
International law can also increase directly the cost of noncompli-
ance with an obligation.  In general, obligations are enforced on the in-
ternational plane in at least four ways.66  For some categories of obliga-
tion, particularly involving coordination problems, international 
obligations can be self-enforcing in that neither party has an incentive to 
deviate.67  In other situations, parties to an agreement can enforce the 
agreement directly through retaliation.  This mechanism works in re-
peated play games, iterated over time, as in the paradigmatic prisoners’ 
dilemma example.68  Obligations can also be enforced through reputa-
tional sanctions enforced by third parties.69  Finally, and relatively rarely, 
violations can lead to direct financial or material sanctions.70  For our 
purposes, the main point is that violations of international obligations 
are, under some circumstances, accompanied by some cost at the interna-
tional level.71  In turn, this can reduce the incentives for violating the 
promise and make the promise more effective for domestic groups. 
As an illustrative example, consider the minorities regimes that 
were an important class of treaties in Europe between World War I and 
World War II.72  The end of the Ottoman and Austro-Hungarian empires 
 
 65. One can characterize this as a solution whereby principals—the voters and interest groups in 
a domestic political environment—are able to reduce their agency costs.  For more on principal-agent 
models, see Eric A. Posner, Agency Models in Law and Economics, in CHICAGO LECTURES IN LAW 
AND ECONOMICS 225 (Eric A. Posner ed., 2000) (discussing principal-agent models); Mathew D. 
McCubbins et al., Administrative Procedures as Instruments of Political Control, 3 J.L. ECON. & ORG. 
243 (1987) (applying principal-agent model to the administrative state); and Pablo T. Spiller & Emer-
son H. Tiller, Decision Costs and the Strategic Design of Administrative Process and Judicial Review, 26 
J. LEGAL STUD. 347, 361–62 (1997) (applying principal-agent model to judicial review). 
 66. Robert Scott & Paul B. Stephan, Self-Enforcing International Agreements and the Limits of 
Coercion, 2004 WIS. L. REV. 551, 581–82 (2004) [hereinafter Scott & Stephan, Self-Enforcing Interna-
tional Agreements]; see also ROBERT SCOTT & PAUL B. STEPHAN, THE LIMITS OF LEVIATHAN 110–11 
(2006). 
 67. See, e.g., Tom Ginsburg & Richard H. McAdams, Adjudicating in Anarchy: An Expressive 
Theory of International Dispute Resolution, 45 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1229, 1324 (2004). 
 68. ROBERT O. KEOHANE, supra, note 60, at 75–78; see ROBERT AXELROD, THE EVOLUTION OF 
COOPERATION 123 (1984). 
 69. Scott & Stephan, Self-Enforcing International Agreements, supra note 66, at 590–93. 
 70. Id. at 570–71. 
 71. Note that we are not asserting or assuming perfect compliance with international obligations, 
or that all violations of international obligations will lead to costs.  So long as there is some positive 
probability of an international cost, the function of enhancing commitment can be effective. 
 72. See HENKIN, supra note 9, at 63–64; JACOB ROBINSON ET AL., WERE THE MINORITIES 
TREATIES A FAILURE? 3–4 (1943); Fred L. Morrison, Between a Rock and Hard Place: Sovereignty and 
International Protection, 80 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 31, 35–38 (2005); John R. Valentine, Toward a Defini-
tion of National Minority, 32 DENV. J. INT’L L. & POL’Y 445, 450–51 (2004).  See generally L.P. MAIR, 
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led to the creation of many new states in Eastern Europe.73  But this cre-
ated a new set of problems, in that national ethnic groups did not always 
reside within the borders of the state, nor were any states free of minori-
ties.74  Certain states, beginning with Poland and Czechoslovakia, con-
cluded treaties with Great Powers promising to protect minority rights 
within their jurisdictions.75  In these treaties, the state promised to ensure 
protection and a certain degree of self-determination for ethnic minori-
ties within its territories.76  These were important antecedents for the 
flowering of human rights law after World War II.77 
How did the minorities regimes work?  The conventional under-
standing of these treaties is that the audience for them was primarily in-
ternational.  By concluding the agreement with Great Powers, the states 
in question posted a reputational bond for their positive treatment of 
minorities.78  The Great Powers would no doubt monitor the new states’ 
performance and might also sanction a state that violated the terms.  A 
state that mistreated its own ethnic minorities would now suffer reputa-
tional harm, and potentially even suffer international economic or mili-
tary sanctions.  The audience for this signal included the voters and gov-
ernments of the large international powers, whose support was needed 
for the prospective states to come into being. 
But it is important to note that the audience for the signal was also 
domestic, within the new countries making the promise.  The minorities 
in question, residing in the midst of larger groups of others, can hardly 
have been enthusiastic about the creation of nation-states around them 
that were explicitly based on the ethnic nationalism of the dominant 
group.  One might expect them to have resisted a development which 
made them suddenly a conspicuous “outsider” in a nationalistic polity of 
insiders.  The new governments needed to reassure these minorities.  To 
do this, they could have promised to treat the minorities well in a domes-
tic constitution or piece of legislation, but by making the promise in the 
form of an international treaty, the promise had greater credibility.79  
 
THE PROTECTION OF MINORITIES: THE WORKING AND SCOPE OF MINORITIES TREATIES UNDER THE 
LEAGUE OF NATIONS (1928). 
 73. MAIR, supra note 72, at v. 
 74. Id. 
 75. Treaty of Poland, Aug. 23, 1919, S. TREATY DOC. NO. 82 (1919); Treaty Between the Princi-
pal Allied and Associated Powers and Czechoslovakia, Sept. 10, 1919, 226 Consol. T.S. 170; see also 
Declaration Concerning the Protection of Minorities in Albania, Oct. 2, 1921, 9 L.N.T.S. 173; Treaty of 
Trianon, June 4, 1920, 6 L.N.T.S. 187. 
 76. See generally MAIR, supra note 72. 
 77. HENKIN, supra note 9, at 169–70. 
 78. See Amir N. Licht, Cross-Listing and Corporate Governance: Bonding or Avoiding?, 4 CHI. 
J. INT’L L. 141, 145–48 (2003) (discussing bonding for international companies engaged in security 
cross-listing); Larry E. Ribstein, Cross-listing and Regulatory Competition, 1 REV. L. ECON. 97, 104–05 
(2005) (discussing bonding in security markets). 
 79. See generally Jon C. Pevehouse, Democratization, Credible Commitments, and Joining Inter-
national Organizations, in LOCATING THE PROPER AUTHORITIES: THE INTERACTION OF DOMESTIC 
AND INTERNATIONAL INSTITUTIONS 25, 25–26 (Daniel Drezner ed., 2003). 
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This promise, in turn, may have helped the politicians establishing the 
new nations, because it reduced the probability that the minorities would 
resist the new government.80  The international promise had domestic 
ramifications, ultimately reinforcing sovereignty by minimizing internal 
dissension. 
Another example comes from the territorial settlement between It-
aly and Austria over South Tyrol in 1946.81  This German-speaking re-
gion had been transferred from the Austro-Hungarian empire to Italy af-
ter World War I, and Mussolini’s assimilationist policies had created 
resentment among the residents.82  After World War II, Austria and Italy 
concluded the Gasperi-Gruber Accord of 1946 that assured equality and 
autonomy for the German-speaking population and special guarantees 
for cultural and economic development.83  Austria retained the right to 
complain on behalf of this population before the United Nations and In-
ternational Court of Justice, making Italy’s promise to its minority more 
credible.84  The regional autonomy of Trentino-Alto Adige was thus bol-
stered by an international agreement, making it more durable than if it 
were secured only by ordinary legislation or even a constitutional provi-
sion.85 
Trade law provides another example.  The WTO provides informa-
tion, typically generated by national reports and other nations’ com-
plaints, which may be of value to domestic interest groups unsure of their 
politicians’ performance of agreements.86  But it also has “teeth” in the 
form of dispute resolution provisions known as the Dispute Settlement 
Understanding (DSU).87  These provisions authorize bilateral retaliation 
against violators of the agreement.88  The dispute resolution process also 
generates a focal point that can facilitate reputational sanctions.89  The 
DSU provides a framework for increasing the possibility of internation-
ally generated costs for violations of the WTO agreements.  This means 
that domestic interest groups such as exporters who value access to for-
 
 80. See also Ratner, supra note 50, at 2065–66 (discussing uti possidetis principle in postcolonial 
Africa along similar lines). 
 81. Elizabeth F. Defeis, Minority Protections and Bilateral Agreements: An Effective Mechanism, 
22 HASTINGS INT’L AND COMP. L. REV. 291, 292–301 (1999); Csaba K. Zoltani & Frank Koszorus, 
Group Rights Defuse Tensions, 20 FLETCHER F. WORLD AFF. 133, 137–38 (1996). 
 82. Defeis, supra note 81, at 297–98; Zoltani & Koszorus, supra note 81, at 137. 
 83. Defeis, supra note 81, at 298; Zoltani & Koszorus, supra note 81, at 138. 
 84. Indeed, Austria did bring a complaint to the General Assembly in 1960. Defeis, supra note 
81, at 299–300. 
 85. Siegfried Weissner, The Movement Toward Federalism in Italy: A Policy-Oriented Perspec-
tive, 15 ST. THOMAS L. REV. 301, 316 n.75 (2002). 
 86. See Milner, supra note 61, at 480. 
 87. Understanding on Rules and Procedures Governing the Settlement of Disputes, Apr. 15, 
1994, Marakesh Establishing the World Trade Organization, Annex 2, Legal Instruments—Results of 
the Uruguay Round, 33 I.L.M. 1125 (1994). 
 88. Id. 
 89. Ginsburg & McAdams, supra note 67, at 1311–12.  See generally Richard McAdams, The 
Expressive Power of Adjudication, 2005 U. ILL. L. REV. 1043 (developing expressive theory of adjudi-
cation). 
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eign markets can count on an international sanction against their own 
government should it renege on the agreement, raising the value of the 
promise to keep foreign markets open.90  These examples show that in 
some cases, one interest group can entrench policies at the international 
level to ensure that the policies survive the fall of the current government 
or even regime. 
3. Delegation 
The third modality is to completely remove the politician’s future 
ability to influence the policy.  This mode relies not so much on costs to 
be imposed on domestic government, but on isolating decisions from the 
control of those governments. 
To the extent that international obligations involve giving up con-
trol to other actors, they reduce domestic autonomy and flexibility.  For 
example, after the currency crises of the 1990s, Argentina sought to 
commit itself to stable policies by tying the peso to the U.S. dollar.  This 
worked precisely because American monetary policy was unlikely to be 
made with Argentina’s interests in mind.91  Argentina thus committed it-
self to following uncertain future policies, by definition outside the con-
trol of Argentine citizens. 
Committing to a monetary policy made outside one’s borders, such 
as in the Argentine example or when other countries sign agreements 
with the International Monetary Fund (IMF), is conventionally under-
stood as a way of delegating decision making to attract international 
capital.  We do not contest that delegation may primarily be addressed to 
international audiences.  However, the audience for such moves can also 
be domestic.  Argentina’s move not only attracted international capital, 
but also assured citizens that they need not remove all their assets from 
the country.92  Delegation made the commitment credible in a way that a 
simple domestic promise could not. 
D. International Law’s Advantages 
As noted above in Part II.A, international obligation is not the only 
means of entrenching policies.  However, international law has signifi-
cant advantages relative to other mechanisms, such as legislative super-
majorities, an independent judiciary, or specialized independent regula-
tory agencies.  A state can set up an independent judiciary, but legislative 
majorities can always, later, intimidate the judges or change their juris-
diction.  An independent judiciary may enhance the value of legislation, 
 
 90. See Brewster, supra note 55, at 515. 
 91. THE ARGENTINE CRISIS AT THE TURN OF THE MILLENNIUM: CAUSES, CONSEQUENCES AND 
EXPLANATIONS 4 (Flavia Fiorucci & Marcus Klein eds., 2004). 
 92. Id. 
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but there is nothing to prevent future majorities from enacting new legis-
lation.  And even independent regulatory commissions can be bribed, in-
timidated, or captured by determined majorities. 
International legal actors, by contrast, are more difficult to control.  
International organizations and courts are arguably beyond the unilateral 
control of any single country, even the most powerful.  Indeed, this is the 
source of concern about a “democratic deficit” in international institu-
tions, a concern that is quite strong in the United States.93 
Independent of its reliance on insulated decision makers, interna-
tional commitment may be a better device to entrench policies simply 
because it is typically more difficult to implement than ordinary legisla-
tion.  In the United States, some international agreements may be more 
difficult to enact than ordinary legislation, but others may not be.  Other 
constitutional schemes vary in terms of the relative difficulty of legisla-
tion and treaties.  Where treaties are easier to enact than legislation, 
their value as a commitment device is obviously reduced.  But this seems 
to be a rare configuration.94 
There is another reason international law may provide more credi-
ble commitments than domestic legislation.  The relevant unit of analysis 
in international law is the state, not the government.  New governments 
can come into power, but they are still bound by the principle of pacta 
sunt servanda and must perform the obligations entered into by a previ-
ous regime.95  This is true, even if the changes are of momentous nature.  
For example, in the Gabcikovo case, the International Court of Justice 
(ICJ) insisted that states retain obligations entered into by communist 
governments operating under a very different economic system in which 
the relevant level of planning was multinational.96  Hungary and Czecho-
slovakia had concluded an agreement to build a joint dam that made 
sense under the socialist system, but was seen as both environmentally 
and economically unfeasible after the fall of communism.97  When both 
Hungary and the Slovak Republic (a successor nation to Czechoslovakia) 
 
 93. John O. McGinnis, Foreign to Our Constitution, 16 NW. U. L. REV. 303, 309 (2006).  But see 
Sarah H. Cleveland, Our International Constitution, 31 YALE J. INT’L L. 1, 104 (2006). 
 94. Stefan Voigt, The Interplay Between National and International Law: Its Economic Effects 
Drawing on Four New Indicators 6 (unnumbered working paper), available at http://ssrn.com/ 
abstract=925796.  Note that constitutional amendment ought also be taken into account in developing 
an economic model of the tradeoffs among law-making devices.  Even if treaties are more difficult to 
entrench than legislation, they will be less reliable as entrenchment devices where the constitution is 
easier to amend because amendment can override treaty commitments.  The French experience with 
the European Union illustrates this story.  French courts found several new commitments of the Euro-
pean Union to be incompatible with the French constitution, which was promptly amended.  Remy-
Granger, supra note 17, at 53. 
 95. Brewster, supra note 55, at 513; see also Ratner, supra note 50, at 2061. 
 96. Gabcikovo-Nagymaros Project (Hung. v. Slovk.), 1997 I.C.J. 43, 47 (Sept. 25); Eyal Ben-
venisti, Domestic Politics and International Resources: What Role for International Law?, in THE ROLE 
OF LAW IN INTERNATIONAL POLITICS: ESSAYS IN INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS AND INTERNATIONAL 
LAW 109, 114 n.21 (Michael Byers ed., 2000). 
 97. Gabcikovo-Nagymaros Project, 1997 I.C.J. at 45. 
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asserted violations of the agreement, the ICJ had to decide whether the 
circumstances had changed so significantly that the states had been re-
leased from their obligations.98  The ICJ found that the obligation re-
mained even though the economic and environmental rationales for the 
planned dam had been utterly transformed.99  In this sense, a constitu-
tional design providing for a particular model of treaty entry will be 
locked in even against future constitutional change, outlasting the gov-
ernment, the entire regime, and even (as in the Gabcikovo case) the state 
itself.  This has the effect of strengthening treaty commitments relative to 
legislation, and makes international law a powerful form of obligation. 
E. International Law’s Disadvantages 
The very qualities that give international law its power to allow poli-
ticians to make credible commitments in the domestic sphere—a decision 
to give up control—have costs.  These costs come in two forms.  First are 
those rooted in the “persistent uncertainty” that permeates the interna-
tional arena.100  Second, there are agency problems associated with inter-
national governance. 
First, the international arena is constantly changing.  New states 
come into being, while old ones die or break up; rising powers displace 
erstwhile hegemons; and new technologies change the relative position of 
states.  The variation in conditions over time means that it is difficult to 
determine in advance the costs that will be associated with violating an 
international obligation.  Some of these costs depend on other states vol-
untarily punishing the violating state through bilateral retaliation or 
third-party reputational sanctions.  These decisions will be made in ac-
cordance with the particular political situation of the potential enforcer 
at the time of violation, as well as the relative power of the violator.  
From the point of view of a domestic interest group seeking to entrench 
its policies in international obligations, this reduces the certainty of an 
externally imposed cost. 
Barbara Koremenos models the world of treaty making as subject 
to a series of exogenous shocks which affect the distribution of gains 
from an agreement.101  The shocks are not anticipatable, are observable 
only at a cost, and are cumulative.102  This means that as time goes on the 
difference between the initial and anticipated distribution of gains and 
the actual distribution in any period can grow quite large.103  Under these 
 
 98. Id. 
 99. Id. at 49 (noting new political situation and rejecting argument that changed circumstances 
modifying treaty obligations). 
 100. Barbara Koremenos, Contracting Around International Uncertainty, 99 AM. POL. SCI. REV. 
549, 550 (2005). 
 101. Id. 
 102. Id. 
 103. Id. 
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circumstances, Koremenos argues that states may prefer international 
agreements that are short in duration so as to allow renegotiation, par-
ticularly when uncertainties abound as to the future distribution of 
gains.104  By analogy, a domestic interest group relying on international 
commitments to entrench policies faces increasing variance in the pros-
pect of externally imposed costs (in addition to externally generated in-
formation and decision making)—although, there is potential for the 
probability of enforcement to increase as well as decrease, depending on 
the direction of change in the international arena.  To the extent states 
are risk-averse, however, they will view the dynamic quality of interna-
tional legal enforcement as a disadvantage and will be reluctant to consti-
tutionalize particular treaties. 
Second, international obligations sometimes involve delegation to 
international organizations or actors that are unaccountable to any do-
mestic body.  It is sometimes asserted that a growing array of regulatory 
and government decisions are made by “networks” of regulators working 
across national boundaries.105  These networks, or specialized epistemic 
communities, are given these powers because of their technocratic exper-
tise in an increasingly complex world.  But, even more than domestic 
regulators, their insulation from control means that they are not ac-
countable.106  This raises the familiar problem of principal and agent.  Na-
tional governments, duly elected by their citizens, may delegate decision 
making to networks of bureaucrats, but there is always the risk that the 
bureaucrats will act in their own collective interest rather than that of 
any national government. 
These forms of uncertainty cut against international commitment.  
There is thus a tradeoff between enhanced credibility of commitments 
through international entrenchment, which is facilitated by giving up 
control of policies, and the risks of agency costs and exogenous change 
that are inherent in the international environment.  Given that there are 
disadvantages as well as advantages to international commitments, we 
ought not to expect every state to have identical constitutional provisions 
on international law, nor should we anticipate that patterns will be stable 
over time.  Some periods, when there is a good deal of change in the in-
ternational arena, will be relatively risky for delegation.  In contrast, 
when international law is stable and enforcement is predictable, the ad-
vantages of international commitment increase for domestic actors. 
 
 104. Id. at 551–52. 
 105. PETER M. HAAS, SAVING THE MEDITERRANEAN: THE POLITICS OF INTERNATIONAL 
ENVIRONMENTAL COOPERATION 7–8 (1990); ANNE-MARIE SLAUGHTER, A NEW WORLD ORDER 10–
11 (2000) [hereinafter SLAUGHTER, A NEW WORLD ORDER]; Peter M. Haas, Introduction: Epistemic 
Communities and International Policy Coordination, 46 INT’L ORG. 1, 3 (1992); Anne-Marie Slaughter, 
The Accountability of Government Networks, 8 IND. J. GLOBAL LEGAL STUD. 347, 347 (2001); Anne-
Marie Slaughter, Global Government Networks, Global Information Agencies and Disaggregated De-
mocracy, 24 MICH. J. INT’L L. 1041 (2003). 
 106. See McGinnis, supra note 93, at 319. 
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F. The Relative Advantages of Custom and Treaty 
We have now seen that international commitments have certain ad-
vantages, including insulation of decision makers and the fact that com-
mitments will survive changes in government or even state structure.  
They also have disadvantages: the insulated decision makers may be un-
accountable, and the changing nature of the international environment 
generates unpredictability.  With these in mind, this section considers the 
relative advantages of custom and treaty in terms of facilitating interna-
tional commitments for domestic actors. 
Traditional international lawyers tended to view the international 
system as unitary in character and cooperation as normatively desirable 
as an end in itself.  Viewing “international obligation” as unitary makes it 
difficult to understand why it is that states would differ in terms of their 
treatment of custom and treaty.  While customary international law and 
treaty law are different in structure and character, most scholarship to 
date has tended to treat states as having propensities toward cooperation 
which may vary by issue area but not by instrument type.  In practice, 
however, states tend to vary their constitutional acceptance of forms of 
international law by instrument, with custom and treaty being treated dif-
ferently.107 
1. Custom 
For present purposes we focus on the distinct processes by which in-
ternational obligations are formed.  Whereas consent is explicit in treaty 
commitments, consent can be implicit in the case of customary interna-
tional law (CIL); states are considered permanently bound unless they 
persistently object to an emerging rule.108  Another key distinction be-
tween customary international law and treaty law is that CIL is created in 
a decentralized fashion.109  States, through official action and opinio juris, 
do create CIL.110  Undertaking certain forms of action may be costly—for 
example refraining from abusing prisoners during wartime.  The costs 
help distinguish customary obligation from mere “cheap talk.”  However, 
the decisions to undertake the action, and the decisions as to what ac-
tions “count,” are highly decentralized.  When a sufficient number of 
states (the precise number is unclear) have acted in a way to indicate 
 
 107. See Voigt, supra note 95, at 14–15; supra Figure 1.  In reality, the distinction between CIL 
and treaties is also overstated.  For example, many investment treaties explicitly or implicitly invoke 
customary international law as the standard for expropriation.  See, e.g., Andrea Bjorklund, Reconcil-
ing State Sovereignty and Investor Protection in Denial of Justice Claims, 45 VA. J. INT’L L. 809, 891–92 
(2005) (discussing the United States’ Model Bilateral Investment Treaty and NAFTA). 
 108. MICHAEL BYERS, CUSTOM, POWER AND THE POWER OF RULES: INTERNATIONAL 
RELATIONS AND CUSTOMARY INTERNATIONAL LAW 192 (1998). 
 109. See id. at 13. 
 110. Id. 
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adoption of the rule, the rule “crystallizes” into CIL and binds all states 
that do not persistently object.111 
These rules are puzzling in a number of ways.112  In particular, they 
do not seem to acknowledge the presence of the persistent uncertainty 
that marks the international system.113  A state may at time T1 be neutral 
towards a particular rule, and thus fail to persistently object.  Exogenous 
shocks, however, can significantly affect the distributional gains from a 
rule of CIL.  If so, then the state could find itself in a position where a 
rule it favored or was neutral towards at time T1 has significant costs at 
time T2.  It will nevertheless be bound by the rule.
114  Unlike treaties, 
which have exit provisions,115 CIL commitments cannot be unilaterally 
denounced after they have become binding.116  The only way to escape 
the obligation will be to convince other states that the rule is ineffective 
and should give way to a new rule. 
This uncertainty might seem to make CIL a particularly attractive 
commitment device.  By joining international regimes which impose 
costs, a state seems to signal its commitment to abide by the obligation 
even if it becomes costly to do so in the future.  If Koremenos is correct, 
this function should be stronger with CIL, which is time unlimited, than 
with agreements which can be, and (as Koremenos demonstrates) fre-
quently are, limited temporally and can be exited.117 
But the problem is that a state cannot specify the content of custom-
ary international law in the same way that a state can specify treaty obli-
gations.  Custom is vague.118  The content is beyond the control of any 
state.  The determination of rules is quite decentralized, with national 
court decisions, international organization statements, policy pro-
nouncements, scholarly writings, and various other materials being com-
monly cited for support of a particular rule proposed by the analyst.  The 
rules are also adjudicated by a myriad of bodies, without any centralized 
mechanism for appeal or control of norm generation.  The potential 
 
 111. Id.; Kontorovich, supra note 59, at 875. 
 112. See Kontorovich, supra note 59, at 877. 
 113. See Koremenos, supra note 100, at 549. 
 114. Of course, if enough states find themselves in this position, the rule of CIL can change.  In 
practice, however, examples of CIL change seem to indicate that strong and powerful states have an 
inordinate influence on the process.  Thus a state of middling power can not anticipate much future 
control over the international legal system. 
 115. See generally Laurence R. Helfer, Not Fully Committed? Reservations, Risk and Treaty De-
sign, 31 YALE J. INT’L L. 367 (2006). 
 116. But see Joost Pauwelyn, How Strongly Should We Protect and Enforce International Law? 14 
(Duke Law Sch. Working Paper Series, Paper No. 44, 2006), available at http://lsr.nellco.org/cgi/ 
viewcontent.cgi?article=1044&context=duke/fs (arguing that CIL obligations are alienable). 
 117. All this assumes that CIL agreements will be enforced.  See Scott & Stephan, Self-Enforcing 
International Agreements, supra note 66, at 552–53. 
 118. BROWNLIE, supra note 8, at 50 (noting that “many rules of [CIL] do not provide precise 
guidance for their application on the national plane”).  Of course, this might explain why states toler-
ate it.  Since the obligations are not precise, states can shift their positions on the interpretation of par-
ticular rules in different situations, to a certain degree. 
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benefits of CIL as an entrenchment device are outweighed by its inability 
to specify authoritatively the particular policy to be entrenched. 
The value of entrenchment may also be reduced because CIL relies 
nearly exclusively on the executive branch for its definition and imple-
mentation.119  Much of the evidence for state practice and consent to 
rules of custom comes from statements by the executive.  The executive, 
typically a ministry of foreign affairs, usually has internal bureaucratic 
competence for representing the state abroad and will be the actor best 
situated to monitor and respond to proposed new rules of customary in-
ternational law.120  While legislation certainly can provide evidence for 
state practice and opinio juris, generally speaking the executive is in the 
best position to monitor and respond to changing rules of CIL.  In addi-
tion, the requirement of state practice is heavily weighted toward the ex-
ecutive branch, for it is national bureaucracies that must ultimately un-
dertake actions enforcing or failing to enforce any particular rule.121  All 
of this means that the commitment is within the control of a single 
branch, so that as control of that branch changes, policy may change too 
easily. 
In terms of the modalities through which international law solves 
domestic commitment problems, these negative qualities of custom out-
weigh its temporal advantage of long-term commitment (or at least 
commitment of uncertain duration).  Because CIL is vague, and its de-
tails are worked out in a diffuse, unpredictable fashion, it has relatively 
little ability to generate information for domestic interest groups.  Be-
cause the enforcement of customary international law is highly decentral-
ized, states face a collective action problem in enforcing norms.  States 
rarely have an incentive to incur the costs of enforcing a rule of CIL 
against a violating state, or generating information for domestic interest 
groups.122  CIL’s only advantage as a precommitment device is that it es-
sentially delegates the law-making function to the collectivity of states.  
Even here, though, CIL’s vagueness renders it ineffective.  The broad 
 
 119. See Julian G. Ku, Structural Conflicts in the Interpretation of Customary International Law, 45 
SANTA CLARA L. REV. 857, 862–64 (2005) (characterizing Executive as primary in the U.S. allocation 
of powers with regard to CIL).  This is likely true notwithstanding the formal position of Article I of 
the U.S. Constitution noted supra at note 28.  The executive primacy in customary international law-
making is even more pronounced in parliamentary systems, in which the government is formed out of 
the legislature.  In these systems the executive predominates both in reacting to statements of custom, 
as well as domestic lawmaking.  Cf. Joanna Harrington, Scrutiny and Approval: The Role for Westmin-
ster-style Parliaments in Treaty-making, 55 INT’L & COMP. L.Q. 121, passim (2006) (discussing various 
parliamentary systems’ adjustments to potential executive dominance). 
 120. See Ku, supra note 119, at 862. 
 121. Our analysis is consistent with John Setear, Treaties, Custom, Iteration and Public Choice, 5 
CHI. J. INT’L L. 715, 728–30 (2005). 
 122. Of course, if the violation of CIL injures a particular state, that state will have an incentive to 
incur the costs of enforcement and publicity.  Many CIL norms, however, concern the treatment of a 
state’s own citizens.  No particular external state has the incentive to take the lead to enforce and pub-
licize violations of these norms.  See Eugene Kontorovich, A Positive Theory of Universal Jurisdiction 
39–42 (The Berkeley Elec. Press, Working Paper No. 211, 2004), available at http://law.bepress.com/ 
cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1515&context=espresso. 
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range of topics that CIL covers means that no domestic interest group 
can be confident that CIL will evolve to cover its specific area of concern.  
CIL’s weakness bodes poorly for its usage to resolve domestic commit-
ment problems.123 
2. Treaties 
In contrast with custom, treaty-making structures have been regu-
larly modeled as a signal to communicate credibility of commitment to 
foreign countries.124  Because legislatures have the ability to frustrate im-
plementation of democratic agreements, other states may not believe the 
executive branch without legislative acquiescence to treaties.  Legislative 
involvement in treaty making communicates information to other states 
as to which type of agreements will be enforced by the state and which 
will not.  They are thus commitment enhancing. 
Constitutionalizing particular treaty commitments is a very strong 
form of signal.  By including the treaty in the text of the constitution, de-
signers raise the cost of exiting the treaty and thus communicate a high 
level of domestic commitment to foreign parties.  They also communicate 
to domestic audiences that the treaty is fundamental and unlikely to be 
exited lightly. 
3. Treaty v. Custom 
With regard to the modalities of information, enforcement, and 
delegation discussed in Part II.C, treaties have significant advantages 
over custom.125  Treaties can tailor the information-generating mecha-
nisms to address the precise needs of domestic interest groups.  The 
complex law of treaty reservations allows states to tailor even multilat-
eral obligations to a great degree.126  Furthermore, treaty regimes identify 
 
 123. Id.; cf. Samuel Estreicher, Rethinking the Binding Effect of Customary International Law, 44 
VA. J. INT’L L. 5 (2003) (illustrating the problems of incorporating CILs into the framework of domes-
tic laws); J. Patrick Kelly, The Twilight of Customary International Law, 40 VA. J. INT’L L. 449, 452 
(2000). 
 124. Jeffrey Frieden & Lisa L. Martin, International Political Economy: Global and Domestic In-
teractions, in POLITICAL SCIENCE: STATE OF THE DISCIPLINE 118, 124 (Ira Katznelson & Helen V. 
Milner eds., 2002); Lisa Martin, The United States and International Commitments: Treaties as Signal-
ing Devices, 35 PRESIDENTIAL STUD. Q. 440 (2005) (showing the choice between executive agreements 
and treaties is a signal of intention to comply); see also Helen V. Milner, The Interaction of Domestic 
and International Politics: The Anglo-American Oil Negotiations and the International Civil Aviation 
Negotiations, 1943–1947, in DOUBLE-EDGED DIPLOMACY: INTERNATIONAL BARGAINING AND 
DOMESTIC POLITICS 207, 208–18 (Peter B. Evans et al. eds., 1993) (noting that shifting an oil accord 
from an executive agreement to a treaty subject to Senate ratification prevented the ultimate accep-
tance of the accord). 
 125. Of course, the precise distinction between treaty and custom used in this article is overstated.  
Sometimes, treaties will serve as evidence of custom, and some treaties will incorporate customary 
international law into the treaty.  They are complements as well as substitutes.  For ease of explication, 
however, we consider the choice between treaty and custom to be a binary one. 
 126. See Edward T. Swaine, Reserving, 31 YALE J. INT’L L. 307, 331–32 (2006 ); see also Laurence 
R. Helfer, supra note 115. 
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specific counterparties, who therefore have an incentive to enforce the 
norms either directly, through reciprocity, or through reputation.127  This 
is quite a contrast to CIL, the enforcement of which is decentralized and 
therefore potentially subject to a collective action problem for states.  
When a state violates a CIL norm concerning the treatment of its own 
citizens, no state has much incentive to take the lead on enforcement, or 
even to identify the violation.128  Treaties can also provide clear, bounded 
delegation of particular decisions.  The plasticity and vagueness of CIL 
obligations, though not infinite, suggest that states will prefer treaty obli-
gations. 
Treaty obligations dominate custom along all three dimensions by 
which international law enhances commitment.  CIL is worse at provid-
ing information and norm enforcement because states are subject to col-
lective action problems.  Delegation of decision making is easy in the 
sense that states give up complete control of norm production when they 
accept a CIL obligation, but the lack of an identified decision maker to 
articulate norms makes it inferior to treaties, where the scope and scale 
of delegation can be precisely designed. 
IV. EMPIRICAL IMPLICATIONS AND HYPOTHESES 
This article has suggested that greater attention needs to be paid to 
domestic constitutional and political structures as determinants of inter-
national legal behavior.  To be sure, a number of authors have made 
similar claims in recent years, typically those associated with the “liberal” 
school of international law and international relations scholarship.129  
Few, however, have actually tested the implications of this claim.  This 
section presents a preliminary empirical evaluation of the theory out-
lined here. 
We begin with the assumption of a single constitutional designer 
considering three issues discussed at the outset of this article: (1) whether 
to make customary international law directly applicable in the domestic 
legal order (for simplicity, we set aside the issue of superiority),130 
 
 127. The incentive is relative to the decentralized regime of CIL enforcement. 
 128. To be sure, one can identify some of the same problems with the broad international human 
rights conventions, such as the International Covenants for Civil and Political Rights, and for Eco-
nomic and Social Rights.  Nevertheless, there is at least the possibility of concluding human rights trea-
ties with specific counter-parties, as the earlier discussion of the Minorities Regimes and the Gasperi-
Gruber treaty showed.  See supra text accompanying notes 72–85. 
 129. See SLAUGHTER, A NEW WORLD ORDER, supra note 105, at 31–35; Brewster, supra note 55; 
Andrew Moravcsik, Taking Preferences Seriously: A Liberal Theory of International Politics, 51 INT’L 
ORG. 513, 544 (1997); Kal Raustiala, Form and Substance in International Agreements, 99 AM. J. INT’L 
L. 581, 585 (2005). 
 130. Some constitutions limit the application of customary international law to interstate relations 
or human rights.  For instance, Article nine of the Constitution of Ecuador (1967) accepts the norms of 
international law as “the standard of conduct for states in their relations with one another” but the 
constitution does not mention human rights.  However, constitutions in our sample rarely make the 
above distinction. 
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(2) whether to incorporate specific treaties into the constitution,131 and 
(3) whether to make treaties superior to domestic law.132  We assume that 
any international obligation comes with some nonzero probability of in-
ternational enforcement, either in the form of generating information for 
domestic groups or a sanction, reputational or otherwise, imposed at the 
international level.  The probability of other states expending resources 
in this manner increases monotonically with the perceived level of com-
mitment of the state in question.  We assume that the domestic judiciary 
will enforce international legal norms in the manner in which the consti-
tutional designer provides.133 
Each decision involves a choice about commitment structure.  As 
described in the previous section, monist incorporation of CIL into do-
mestic law has serious defects, because both the content of norms and the 
expected costs of violation are quite variable in a changing international 
environment.134  We should expect this device to be utilized only when 
there are particular kinds of public goods that can only be obtained from 
the CIL form of international commitment, for which substitute mecha-
nisms are insufficient. 
A. Regime Type 
Let us now consider one very important dimension on which states 
vary, namely regime type.  A broad theoretical and empirical literature 
suggests that democracies and autocracies behave differently with regard 
to a wide range of international phenomena.  Democracies do not go to 
war with each other.135  They cooperate on trade agreements more of-
ten.136  Some scholars have even argued that democracies comply with in-
ternational obligations to a greater extent.137  Without commitment the-
 
 131. See supra notes 34–35 and accompanying text. 
 132. Some constitutions distinguish certain types of treaties. Romania’s 1991 Constitution, for 
example, makes human rights treaties superior to domestic law as opposed to other international trea-
ties, which are made equal to domestic law.  CONST. OF ROMANIA arts. 11, 20 (1991).  This is very un-
usual in our current sample. 
 133. This assumption is heroic, of course, but serves the present discussion. 
 134. See discussion supra Part III.E. 
 135. The voluminous literature on the Democratic Peace begins with IMMANUEL KANT, 
PERPETUAL PEACE (1795).  See generally PAUL K. HUTH & TODD L. ALLEE, THE DEMOCRATIC 
PEACE AND TERRITORIAL CONFLICT IN THE TWENTIETH CENTURY (2002); CHARLES LIPSON, 
RELIABLE PARTNERS: HOW DEMOCRACIES HAVE MADE A SEPARATE PEACE (2003); R.J. Rummel, 
Democratic Peace Bibliography Version 3.0, http://www.hawaii.edu/powerkills/BIBLIO.HTML (last 
visited Nov. 9, 2007).  Note that democracies do go to war with autocracies, so democracies cannot be 
characterized as generally peaceful. 
 136. Edward D. Mansfield, Helen V. Milner & B. Peter Rosendorff, Why Democracies Cooperate 
More: Electoral Control and International Trade Agreements, 56 INT’L ORG. 477, 479 (2002). 
 137. See, e.g., Anne-Marie Burley, Law Among Liberal States: Liberal Internationalism and the 
Act of State Doctrine, 92 COLUM. L. REV. 1907 (1992); Anne-Marie Slaughter, International Law in a 
World of Liberal States, 6 EUR. J. INT’L L. 503, 508 (1995).  But see Xinyuan Dai, Why Comply? The 
Domestic Constituency Mechanism, 59 INT’L ORG. 363, 379 n.16 (2005) (democracies do not comply 
more); Anne-Marie Slaughter, A Liberal Theory of International Law, 94 AM. SOC’Y INT’L L. PROC. 
240, 252 (2000) (only more likely to comply with international dispute resolution). 
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ory, one would expect democracies to have more international commit-
ments.  If democracies are more internationalist than autocracies, as lib-
eral theory posits, then one would assume democracies would seek to fa-
cilitate international engagement. 
Not all democracies are equally situated: within the category of de-
mocracies, certain countries will have greater need for the credibility of 
commitments.  Of particular importance here are newly democratizing 
countries.  New democracies have little international reputation and thus 
need more credibility on the international plane.  But they also have 
greater difficulty committing to domestic groups.  Frequently they are 
following regimes in which government power was used against citizens, 
and citizens are unlikely to believe mere promises that rights will be pro-
tected.  There is less of a record on which to judge whether promises will 
be kept.  Citizens may also believe that the regime itself is fragile and 
unlikely to survive. 
Democracies, then, may steer towards more internationalist consti-
tutions, but new democracies may well oversteer in that direction for 
compensatory reasons.  As such, we should thus expect greater demand 
for commitment mechanisms of international law, including both cus-
tomary international law and treaty obligations, in democratic constitu-
tions, but particularly in newly democratic constitutions. 
B. Diffusion 
In accordance with diffusion theory, we should predict that, like 
other international devices, there is a certain degree of clustering that oc-
curs when it comes to adopting a particular constitutional posture toward 
international law.138  The basic hypothesis is that the enactment of a pro-
vision in one constitution (particularly one in a neighboring or otherwise 
proximate country) increases the probability of the enactment of the 
provision in another.  Following convention,139 we can think of this gen-
eral phenomenon as diffusion, a category that includes a host of more 
specific causal processes.  Zachary Elkins and Beth Simmons show that 
most of these mechanisms fall into two broad categories—learning and 
adaptation.140  In the case of learning, a prior enactment provides infor-
mation for other governments facing a similar choice.141  The assumption 
is that decision makers are operating under conditions of severe cogni-
tive constraint.142  This assumption may be especially appropriate with 
respect to constitutional drafting situations that follow crises, in which 
 
 138. See Elkins, Guzman & Simmons, supra note 54, at 274. 
 139. Elkins & Simmons, supra note 4, at 36. 
 140. Id. at 39. 
 141. Id. at 42. 
 142. Id. at 43. 
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drafters do not have the luxury of careful rumination.143  Under such 
conditions, existing constitutional models—especially those of countries 
deemed to be analogous or successful, but also those that are highly 
available—are likely to be influential guides for decision makers.  In the 
case of processes of adaptation, a prior enactment may not only impart 
information about the utility of the choice, it may also alter the utility it-
self.144  One characteristic of such mechanisms is that the utility of the 
particular policy or practice depends upon the number of users.145  A 
paradigmatic example might be the network externalities associated with 
the density of a telephone network or the density of subscription to a 
particular industry standard (e.g., the QWERTY keyboard).146  The de-
velopment of norms, in which reputational benefits accrue according to 
the number or identity of countries that subscribe to a particular consti-
tutional provision, operates in this way.  Regardless of whether diffusion 
takes the form of learning or adaptation, however, the general empirical 
result is the same: the clustering of enacted provisions among countries 
that are proximate along some dimension, whether geographically, cul-
turally, politically, or economically. 
Eric Posner and Cass Sunstein recently developed an account of 
why it is sometimes advisable to adopt institutions from abroad, similar 
to learning.147  In considering whether and when courts ought to rely on 
foreign decisions, they utilize the Condorcet Jury Theorem, which holds 
that, under certain specified conditions, more decision makers involved 
in a particular decision are more likely to produce an accurate result.148  
By extension, a country can draw information from another country’s 
decision to adopt a particular institution.  This is true so long as the first 
country’s decision is independent, reflects considered judgment, and so 
long as conditions are similar along the relevant criteria for the two coun-
tries.  If one believes these criteria are broadly met in institutional adap-
tation, then borrowing is normatively attractive.  On the other hand, if 
one is skeptical that these conditions exist, diffusion is likely to merely 
reflect trends and nonrational factors. 
One tractable way to explore diffusion effects is to incorporate spa-
tial lags of the dependent variable in regressions that specify a baseline 
set of domestic predictors.  Spatial lags are similar to temporal lags ex-
cept that they lag the dependent variable one (or more) units in space.149  
 
 143. See, e.g., Julian Go, A Globalizing Constitutionalism? Views from the Postcolony, 1945–2000, 
18 INT’L SOC. 71, 71 (2003) (noting that a majority of postcolonial states have redrafted their original 
constitutions). 
 144. Elkins & Simmons, supra note 4, at 39. 
 145. Id. at 39–40. 
 146. Id. at 41. 
 147. Eric A. Posner & Cass R. Sunstein, The Law of Other States, 59 STAN. L. REV. 131, 160–64 
(2006). 
 148. Id. at 141. 
 149. Beth A. Simmons & Zachary Elkins, The Globalization of Liberalization: Policy Diffusion in 
the International Political Economy, 98 AM. POL. SCI. REV. 171, 178 (2004). 
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They allow one to test whether the central tendency in a country’s 
neighborhood in one year is associated with that country’s choice in a 
subsequent year.150  Typically, scholars posit that channels of influence 
run along geographic lines, but of course neighborhoods can be defined 
along any dimension of similarity or interaction.151  In the analysis that 
follows, we employ two basic spatial lags in order to explore the possibil-
ity of clustering.  The first, which captures global norms, is the mean of 
the dependent variable among all constitutions in force in the previous 
year.  The second, which captures geographic neighborhood effects, is 
the mean of the dependent variable in a country’s region in the previous 
year.  Both of these variables are liable to absorb common shocks or any 
domestic variables that affect countries simultaneously that are omitted 
from the model.  Thus, until the model is fully specified, one should be 
wary of ascribing causal power to diffusion explanations.  Nonetheless, 
the spatial lags allow us to rule out diffusion at this point as an alterna-
tive hypothesis. 
V. EVIDENCE 
To summarize the hypotheses, we expect that democracies will, on 
average, be more likely than others to write constitutions that defer to 
international law.  We also expect this monist streak to be most prevalent 
among new democracies—that is, those that emerge from a recent past 
checkered by authoritarianism.  Such states need credibility of commit-
ments.  As such, we expect both a main effect of contemporaneous de-
mocracy and a negative interaction between contemporaneous democ-
racy and the recent democratic past.  On the strength of the 
complementary diffusion processes we describe above, we also expect a 
considerable degree of interdependence among constitutional decisions 
across states, both globally and regionally (to the extent that geography 
defines relevant reference groups). 
In general we predict that states will be less inclined to incorporate 
CIL than they will be to provide for treaty commitments, which can be 
precisely tailored.  This is consistent with our argument that CIL pro-
vides a vaguer form of commitment, one that is less precise in terms of 
the scope of obligations and the enforcement mechanisms at issue. 
We consider here some preliminary evidence for these propositions 
based on a sample of 363 constitutions coded as part of the Comparative 
Constitutions Project at the University of Illinois.152  The sample consists 
of nearly every current national constitution in force among independent 
 
 150. Id. 
 151. Id. 
 152. Comparative Constitutions Project, supra note 32. 
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states.153  It also includes roughly 150 historical constitutions that are 
drawn from our archive; eventually we will include data on every na-
tional constitution ever written.154 
Consider first the issue of democracies versus autocracies.  For de-
scriptive purposes, we begin by characterizing each constitutional design 
situation as either newly democratic, newly authoritarian, stable democ-
ratic, or stable authoritarian.  We based these classifications on a com-
parison of the Polity scores of states in the year following constitutional 
promulgation versus an average of those scores during the five years 
prior to promulgation.155  For simplicity, we defined democracies as those 
with a Polity score above 5, a threshold that corresponds closely to di-
chotomous measures of democracy such as that of Adam Przeworski et 
al.156 
With regard to treaties, we examine whether the constitution men-
tions treaties at all, whether it refers to a particular treaty, and whether it 
provides for treaty superiority to domestic legislation.  We also ask about 
treatment of CIL.  The table below summarizes the data for the sample 
of current and historical constitutions, giving the proportion of constitu-
tions with the relevant characteristic. 
Figure 3 demonstrates that what might be called “democratizing 
constitutions” are generally more internationalist than are constitutions 
written in either established democracies or autocracies.  They are more 
likely to give treaties superior status and to make customary interna-
tional law directly binding (though less likely than autocracies to mention 
treaties).  This finding is consistent with the idea that new democracies 
need to provide more credible international and domestic commitments.  
New democracies lack both a reputation for cooperation and other 
mechanisms for obtaining goods in the international arena.  The finding 
is especially strong when we compare constitutions of newly democratic 
states to those of states that have been democratic for at least five years 
(“continuously democratic states”).  Continuously democratic states are 
much less likely to incorporate customary international law—less likely, 
even, than authoritarian states.  Forty-five percent of newly democratic 
states mention customary international law, versus twenty and fifteen  
 
 
 153. There are a half dozen current countries not included in the sample because of difficulties 
characterizing exactly which documents ought be considered the constitution.  These include countries 
that have no formal written constitution such as Israel, United Kingdom, New Zealand, and Saudi 
Arabia, and others for whom the precise scope of constitutional text is not fully agreed upon by schol-
ars, such as Canada and Sweden. 
 154. The current sample is randomly drawn in the sense that our coders selected them without 
accord to any specific criteria. 
 155. Polity is a widely used database in political science that measures the level of democracy and 
autocracy on a twenty point scale.  Center for International Development and Conflict Management, 
http://www.cidcm.umd.ed/polity/about (last visited Aug. 18, 2007). 
 156. ADAM PRZEWORSKI ET AL., DEMOCRACY AND DEVELOPMENT: POLITICAL INSTITUTIONS 
AND WELL-BEING IN THE WORLD, 1950–1990, at 15–32 (2000). 
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FIGURE 3 
REGIME TYPE AND CONSTITUTIONAL TREATMENT OF INTERNATIONAL 
LAW 
Universe: Constitutions of independent states (1800–2000) 
Regime 










































































*Significant at .05%.  T-tests were performed using the relevant cate-
gory against all other categories combined. 
Source: Comparative Constitutions Project 
percent of continuously authoritarian and continuously democratic 
states, respectively.  Across each of these groups, approximately half of 
those constitutions that mention customary international law go on to 
make it directly binding.  Again, these patterns are consistent with the 
demand for both international and domestic commitment in new democ-
racies.157 
 
 157. Bivariate regressions confirms this analysis.  AUTDEM predicts Directly Applicable Cus-
tomary International Law, with a positive coefficient of .01, at the 99% confidence level. 
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The contrast between constitutional treatment of custom and treaty 
is important.  The analysis in Part II suggested that custom had distinct 
defects as a mechanism to make commitments.  This led us to predict 
that states would systematically be more reluctant to rely on constitu-
tional acceptance of customary international law than they would the 
more precise and flexible instrument of treaties.  Ninety-one percent of 
all current constitutions mention treaties, whereas only twenty-three per-
cent mention customary international law.  In every subset of countries, 
treaties are more likely than custom to be mentioned and to be superior 
to legislation.  This provides support for the analysis in Part II about the 
flaws of custom as a law-making and commitment device. 
A more sophisticated analysis requires regression techniques.  Here, 
we execute a series of regression analyses on our dependent variables of 
interest, using our complete sample of 363 constitutions. 
Variables: 
Global Mean, t-1.  This variable captures the global mean value of 
the dependent variable in the year before the constitution was adopted.  
It is used to capture temporal clustering, an early warning sign of diffu-
sion. 
Regime Stability.  This is the mean absolute value of yearly change 
in the Polity IV democracy variable for the thirty years preceding the 
Constitution’s adoption.  Our theory suggests that one reason countries 
may seek to constitutionalize international law is to compensate for in-
stable political environments.  Hence regime instability ought to be posi-
tively associated with the decision to internationalize the constitution. 
Transitions: (a) Newly Democratic; (b) Stable Authoritarian.  These 
are dummy variables measured as described and employed in the discus-
sion of Figure 3 above.  The two excluded categories from the four possi-
ble categories are “newly authoritarian” (for which we only have one 
case) and “stable democratic.”  Thus, the effects of the included dummy 
variables should be interpreted with “stable democratic” as the baseline. 
GDP per capita.  We use this to measure level of development.  It is 
drawn from the World Bank’s World Development Indicators.158 
Population.  This is total population drawn from the World Bank’s 
World Development Indicators.159 
Figure 4 reports the Ordinary Least Squares results of two fairly 
parsimonious models of the constitutional status of customary interna-
tional law (column 1) and treaties (column 2).  More specifically, the de-
pendent variables are dichotomous measures of whether customary in-
ternational law is directly binding and whether international treaties are  
 
 
 158. The World Bank Group, World Development Indicators (2006), available at http://devdata. 
worldbank.org/wdi2006/contents/cover.htm. 
 159. Id. 
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FIGURE 4 
REGRESSION MODELS OF CUSTOMARY INTERNATIONAL LAW AND 
TREATY STATUS 
Universe: Independent states (1800–2002) 
 Dependent Variable 
 CIL Status Treaty Status 
Global Mean, t-1 0.948* 1.775** 
 (0.414) (0.266) 
   
Average Change in Democracy  -0.019 0.039 
   [t-1,…, t-30] (0.030) (0.035) 
   
Stable Authoritarian 0.111* 0.131* 
 (0.048) (0.057) 
   
Newly Democratic 0.270** 0.155* 
 (0.061) (0.071) 
   
GDP per capita (constant 1995 US$) 0.043 -0.014 
   (in 10,000s) (0.028) (0.034) 
   
Population, total -0.045 -0.186 
   (in billions) (0.134) (0.158) 
   
Constant -0.101 -0.129 
 (0.065) (0.067) 
   
Observations 363 363 
R-squared 0.07 0.16 
Standard errors in parentheses 
*significant at 5%, ** significant at 1% 
superior to ordinary law, respectively.  The results of the two models are 
roughly comparable, suggesting that we can speak of them as conse-
quences of the same causal processes.  Both sets of results provide cor-
roboratory evidence for the two central causal stories we describe above. 
First, the regime transition variables confirm some of the bivariate 
results we report above.  That is, compared to stable democracies (the 
baseline category), new democracies are significantly more likely to defer 
to customary international  law (b=.27) as well as international treaties 
(b=.16).  Interestingly, authoritarian constitutions that continue in the 
authoritarian tradition are also more likely to do so, although to a lesser 
extent, again, bolstering some of the bivariate observations above.  These 
results together suggest that an authoritarian past (at least an immediate 
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past) is associated with an abdication to international law in general, but 
especially when the actors in question are crafting a democratic future.160 
A second set of results concerns the global mean, lagged one year.  
Again, this is a catch-all variable that taps a very general sense of global 
trends and norms.  The coefficients on both variables suggest rather 
dramatic effects.  We should be somewhat guarded regarding the inter-
pretation of these effects, as these sorts of lagged means capture not only 
the effect of an interdependence among countries (i.e., diffusion), but 
also that of any excluded variable correlated with time.  However, the 
predictive power of this variable suggests that we cannot rule out the 
possibility of a significant diffusion effect. 
VI. CONCLUSION: ENHANCING DEMOCRACY THROUGH 
CONSTITUTIONALIZING INTERNATIONAL LAW 
International law provides important channels by which govern-
ments can make commitments in the domestic legal order.  The constitu-
tion provides a structure for these commitments.  We have argued that 
constitutional drafters, in designing the interface between the domestic 
and international legal orders, will take advantage of international law as 
a way of locking in particular policies (in the form of treaties). 
This paper has argued that constitutionalizing international law is a 
particularly useful strategy for new democracies.  These regimes typically 
operate in an environment with little trust in government, often in the 
shadow of recent severe human rights violations.  Understandably, do-
mestic audiences in such circumstances may have little confidence in the 
ability of the government to keep its promises.  Scholars have observed 
that entering into treaties provides a way for governments to make their 
commitments to domestic audiences more credible.161  We have added 
the observation that constitutions, as devices designed to ensure com-
mitments generally, are likely to reflect this logic in their treatment of in-
ternational law. 
States do not remain new democracies forever.  If the democratic 
regime survives its infancy, some of the costs of international commit-
 
 160. It is also possible that authoritarian constitution-writers adopt more internationalist constitu-
tions as “cheap talk,” designed to signal to the international community that the country takes interna-
tional law seriously.  This story is not tested here, but is similar to that told by Professor Hathaway 
with regard to international human rights treaties.  Oona Hathaway, Do Human Rights Treaties Make 
a Difference?, 111 YALE L.J. 1935, 2022 (2002) (arguing that some countries sign human rights treaties 
with no intention of improving their human rights performance). 
 161. Ratner, supra note 50, at 2072 (citing CARLOS SANTIAGO NINO, RADICAL EVIL ON TRIAL 
68–69 (1996)) (describing the postjunta Argentine President’s plans for ratifications of international 
human rights treaties); see also Andrew Moravcsik, The Origins of Human Rights Regimes: Democ-
ratic Delegation in Postwar Europe, 54 INT’L ORG. 217, 243–44 (2000) (concluding that newly democ-
ratizing states choose to enter treaties to “lock in” human rights). But see Beth Simmons, Why Com-
mit? Explaining State Acceptance of International Human Rights Obligations (unpublished working 
paper 2002) (finding limited empirical support for lock-in by many states). 
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ments may begin to outweigh the benefits.  To the extent that interna-
tional law delegates decisions to outsiders, policies may conflict with lo-
cal democratic preferences.  International politics are dynamic, and the 
policies protected at the time the constitution was adopted may change 
over time, particularly with regard to customary international law.  As 
democracy matures, we might see pressures to shift from broadly interna-
tionalist constitutional practice toward more parochial policy.162 
Our findings in this article remind us that we ought to think of the 
functions of international law, not merely from an interstate perspective 
but from an intrastate perspective.  This view, known as the liberal ap-
proach to international law, has long focused on understanding the do-
mestic origins of international discourse.  We extend this approach to ex-
amining constitutional functions of international rules.  International law, 
although often described as in tension with local democracy, in fact can 
help facilitate democratization, by making the promises of new democra-
cies more believable. 
 
 162. Arguably, this pattern describes the United States’ approach, as we have become less inter-
nationalist than at the founding.  The founders assumed that international law applied and constrained 
their actions.  Cleveland, supra note 93, at 51.  We now see more public and academic skepticism 
about international law.  Bradley, supra note 26, at 566.  Letter from John Bolton, U.S. Under Sec’y of 
State, to Sec’y Gen. Kofi Annan (May 6, 2002), available at http://www.state.gov/r/pa/pres/ps/2002/ 
9968.htm. 
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